Democracy used to be a word that international legal commentators preferred to avoid. At least by the second half of the present century, this was not because too few governments identified themselves as democratic. It was rather because too many did so. The world's most repressive regimes joined their more representative counterparts in claiming a title that had become synonymous with praiseworthy and justified politics. In some cases modifying adjectives were used ('one-party democracy', 'people's democracy', etc.); in other cases the appropriation was unmodified. Either way, observers found normative inferences difficult to draw, for democracy appeared to mean everything, and therefore nothing.
lacks in euphony). Liberal miUCTarianism is the analytical framework adopted in this article, and the first section sketches the key features that are here associated with it The second section then reviews the international legal scholarship in which the claims under discussion are elaborated. The final section considers to what extent, and with what consequences, that scholarship exhibits a liberal millenarian perspective. This article's conclusion is that, if international law is to lend its support to ongoing efforts to extend and deepen democracy's purchase, the emerging norm of democratic governance and liberal internationalism offer, at best, a partial agenda.
L Liberal Millenariaiilsiii
Liberal millenarianism finds its most extreme, and certainly its best known, expression in the work of Francis Fukuyama in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 5 Fukuyama undoubtedly set out to provoke, and this be very effectively did. His work of this period attracted many critics and few unqualified supporters. 6 One is tempted to dismiss him as isolated, a passing gadfly not to be taken too seriously. To do that would, however, be to ignore his many qualified supporters. It would be to overlook that his premises and argument found resonance -and continue to find resonancein the work of a broad spectrum of commentators, including many whose outlooks are considerably more moderate than his. Liberal millenarianism refers to this whole spectrum. That said, precisely because he articulates in bold, telegraphic fashion, and even at times rhetorically overstates, that which others more delicately bury or hedge, Fukuyama's work offers an excellent vantage point for surveying the shared terrain.
A. Fukuyama and the End of History
Fukuyama's central thesis is that the end of the Cold War confirms a worldwide consensus in favour of liberalism, including not just capitalism but liberal democracy as well. As he sees it, liberalism has conquered all rival ideologies, most recently communism, and liberal democracy is now the sole legitimate system of gov- What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such; that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. 8 This claim obviously relies on a distinctive notion of 'history*. If most scholars today conceive history as without grand design, Fukuyama considers this an understandable response to the abominations of the first half of the twentieth century. But he holds that this conception now requires rethinking. In the events of the century's closing decades be finds warrant for returning to the teleological notion of history that can be found in the work of Hegel and Marx, their secular reworkings of the pre-modem deterministic understanding. According to this perspective, history is purposive, directional, progressive, and oriented towards a particular goal. Fukuyama endorses the view, which he identifies especially with Hegel, 9 that the goal towards which history is oriented is rationality and freedom, and that human societies progress towards it dialectically, through the clash of ideologies. The culmination -or 'end' -of history is eventually reached when perfect freedom and rationality are attained, and the clash of ideologies is resolved. This is what Fukuyama argues may now have occurred. Ideological competition appears to be over. Whereas Marx thought democracy in the shape of communism was our final destiny, it turns out -so Fukuyama holds -to be liberal democracy that has emerged from the fray, to await us at the end of history. It turns out to be liberal democracy that overcomes all the defects, irrationalities and contradictions of earlier forms of government, and promises to bring the historical dialectic to a close. Fukuyama recognizes, of course, that not all countries of the world have embraced liberal democracy, and that those which have done so face continuing challenges. His point, he insists, is that history may have ended in the sense that the ideology of liberal democracy represents the final stage of political evolution. By this he means that the idea of liberal democracy cannot be improved upon. Ideology and ideas are one thing; practice is quite another, and in this case lags far behind. Thus, the end of history does not entail that there may, or will, be no further events and no further conflict Nationalism and religion, in particular, appear to Fukuyama likely to remain sources of violence. Many societies have not yet begun, or have scarcely begun, to realize liberal democracy, and will face turbulent times before they do. In particular, he remarks, 'the vast bulk of the Third World remains very much mired in history'.
10 Even 'post-historical', Western societies have incom-pletely implemented liberal democratic principles. For this reason they are likely to experience continuing internal strife. In their relations with one another, however, war has -so Fukuyama holds -become 'unthinkable'. 11 In this connection, he argues that the post-historical West should actively defend its gains through a 'league of democratic nations', 'capable of forceful action to protect its collective security from threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world', and 'inclined also to expand the sphere of democracy, where possible and prudent'. 12 Why is it that liberal democracy has achieved such a victory, at least at the level of ideas or consciousness? On what basis does Fukuyama claim that liberal democracy embodies perfect rationality and freedom? He takes die view that die main engine of progress in die modem world is what he terms the 'logic of modem natural science'. 13 By this be means instrumental rationality, especially calculations of economic cost and benefit According to Fukuyama the logic of modem natural science accounts for the triumph of capitalism and the establishment of a 'universal consumer culture'. It also accounts for the decline of traditional forms of social organization and the profound worldwide impact of technological innovation. But of itself tiiis logic cannot account for liberal democracy's privileged place in history. While liberal democratic countries generally fare best economically, and while economic modernization may help create the material conditions for liberal democracy, such as urbanization and education, economic efficiency may in some contexts milifntff in favour of authoritarian-bureaucratic government, rather than liberal democracy. Economics alone cannot explain liberal democracy's consummate status. In his words, die logic of modem natural science 'gets us to the gates of die Promised Land of liberal democracy, but does not quite deliver us to die other side'. 14 Fukuyama believes that liberal democracy may represent die ultimate form of government because it satisfies certain fundamental human psychological needs. These he refers to (drawing again on Hegel) as the desire for 'recognition', a desire he takes to be manifested in such feelings as self-respect, self-esteem, dignity, ambition, pride and concern for prestige. For Fukuyama 'die problem of human history can be seen ... as the search for a way to satisfy die desire of both masters and slaves for recognition on a mutual and equal basis; history ends with the victory of a societal order dial accomplishes tiiat goal'. 15 As he sees it, liberal democracy is diat order, it offers a framework for mutual and equal recognition of all citizens. 
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And yet, if liberal democracy awaits us at history's end, there is another sense in which, according to Fukuyama, the human desire for recognition will be left profoundly unfulfilled, even debilitated. There is an aspect of that desire that can only find fulfilment in the context of ideological competition. Whereas those -he refers to them as the 'first men* -who began the struggle for liberal democracy had to exhibit courage, take risks, and aim high, the 'last men' at the end of history will have no further need of heroism. 16 Indeed, they will be encouraged not to stand out Fukuyama worries about the mediocrity, ignobility and materialism of liberal democracy's 'last men*. Following in the tradition of Tocqucville and others, 17 his enthusiasm for democracy is tinged with regret for the decline of aristocracy, and a belief that too much equality, rather than too little, may pose liberal democracy's greatest challenge.
R f .nwnl MfflpimHankra
This thesis was widely interpreted -and Fukuyama himself confirms that it was intended -as an attempt to provide an antidote to the prevailing 'declinist' mood of American political analysis in the 1980s.
18 Those 'pessimists' who were continuing to assert that the power and influence of the United States were in decline had failed to notice the 'good news' 19 that a 'liberal revolution' was underway worldwide. Those 'intellectuals who believe they grasp the world in all its complexity and tragedy' 20 had tailed to see that history has a pattern, and that, posturing aside, '[tjoday ... we have trouble imagining a world that is radically better than our own'.
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Patently, Fukuyama's antidote was strong stuff. Though not without ambivalences, his work makes few concessions to those who do not share his outlook, and is almost ostentatious in its disdain for those he takes to be left-liberal or, perhaps, un-American. And yet, his themes are not confined to what has been called the New Right Rather, they appear, as noted at the outset, to exemplify a more widely held perspective. It is this perspective to which liberal millenarianism refers. Its key features may be summarized as follows.
In the first place there is the notion that history has a telos. This involves a view of historical change as directional, linear and evolutionary, with identifiable developmental stages and an end-point that can be known, and potentially reached. Secondly, there is the supposition that history's telos is liberalism, or at any rate liberal democracy in association with a market-oriented economy. This is based both on an empirical assertion that all alternatives to liberalism have been eliminated, and on a normative assertion that liberalism is superior to all alternatives. A third feature is a distinctive voice, a 'we' who (fine tuning aside) have liberal democracy and experience no serious -or, at any rate, no intractable -problems, in contradistinction to a non-liberal 'they' (in the Third World and elsewhere) for whom things will necessarily remain more complicated and more unpleasant Finally, there is a distinctive tone, a call to celebrate the present, tempered perhaps by nostalgia for the past, but nonetheless optimistic, confident and flushed with a sense of victory over the forces of regression.
Millenarianism refers in Christian doctrine to the belief that Christ will return to reign on earth for a thousand years. More generally, it is applied to premonitions of global futures of diverse kinds, but especially redemptive ones. 22 Liberal millenarianism's millenarianism thus consists in its perception that the world may stand on the brink of an unprecedented era of peace and good government, a perception which is millenarian also in the more literal sense that it pertains to the millennium about to begin. 23 Reinforcing the millenarian character of this vision in Fukuyama's work is the annunciatory, exalted, sometimes even ecstatic, language in which it is expressed, and the evocation of eschatological, especially evangelical, 24 The following discussion draws mainly on Held, supra note 6; Macey and Miller, supra note 6; Htmtington, supra note 6; and Derrida, supra note 24. These critiques proceed, it should be noted, from widely divergent standpoints and reach widely divergent conclusions from their analysis of Fuknyama.
C liberal MlHenarianfam and Democracy
One striking feature of Fukuyama's argument is that it largely proceeds as if there is, and can be, only one liberalism, one democracy and one liberal democracy. While recognizing a certain diversity of institutional arrangements, Fukuyama fails to consider the diversity of values and beliefs that contributes to producing divergent understandings of the meaning of liberalism and democracy, and of their interrelation. Liberal democracy cannot spell the end of ideological struggle because it is itself the subject of ideological contestation, and will continue to be so.
What, then, of Fukuyama's own understanding of liberalism, democracy and liberal democracy? A number of critics highlight Fukuyama's failure to address the tension between liberalism and democracy. Tbe liberal preoccupation with rights and freedom from government control, and the democratic preoccupation with equal participation in, and accountability of, public power, may point in different directions. Rights and freedoms justified by reference to liberalism may compromise the extent to which all citizens are equally enabled to participate in politics; political decisions justified by reference to democracy may compromise individuals' rights and freedoms. On this point David Held observes that Fukuyama endorses economic liberalism, without examining the extent to which the 'free market' constrains democratic processes, by generating and sustaining systematic inequalities of wealth that involve systematic inequalities of power. 26 Thus, without addressing the implications of doing so, Fukuyama effectively resolves the tension between liberalism and democracy in favour of liberalism (especially in its neo-liberal economic aspect). This leads him, Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller remark, to proclaim a victory for liberal democracy wherever he sees economic liberalism.
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Also of concern is Fukuyama's 'uncritical affirmation' 28 of liberal democracy. He neglects to investigate alternatives to prevailing liberal democratic practices, and gives little sign of grasping the limitations of those practices. Indeed he leaves largely unexplained the basis on which an evaluation might be made. His celebration of liberal democracy, thus ungrounded, overlooks the obvious failures of liberal democracy, its omissions with respect to the historic promise of self-rule on the basis of equality among citizens. These omissions find reflection in the pervasiveness of unaccountable power and the persistence of asymmetrical life chances between sexes, ethnic groups and classes. 29 At the same time, Fukuyama's celebration obvious fact that not all societies have embraced liberal democracy. But does this thesis not presuppose compelling evidence as regards aspirations, even if not as regards political practices and institutions? What precisely is Fukuyama's 'good news'? Derrida calls attention to the way Fukuyama characterizes liberal democracy both as an ideal and as an occurrence, alternating between the two to suit his argument 33 On the one hand, Fukuyama refutes evidence that contradicts his thesis, insisting that he is speaking of an ideal that transcends events. On the other hand, he maintains that events have occurred -the death of communism, the establishment of liberal democracy and capitalism as ideologies of near-universal choice, the recognition accorded by Western liberal democracies to their citizens -which represent die realization of this ideal. Fukuyama's 'good news' thus intends to refer, Derrida shows, bom to an accomplished fact and to a vision of the future.
This leads to a final observation. Inasmuch as Fukuyama's linear conception of history admits of only one future, it reduces and oversimplifies the processes of historical change. While Fukuyama acknowledges that reversals are possible, he assumes that the trends he identifies will broadly continue. In this, Samuel Huntington observes, Fukuyama overstates the predictability of history and the permanence of the moment Current trends may continue, but experience suggests that they may well not 34 The historical record to date offers little support for Fukuyama's notion of progress. Held too finds that Fukuyama has failed to appreciate the contingency of events and the complexity of social processes. Held highlights that Fukuyama's essentialized conception of 'man' and his two master engines of modernity (instrumental rationality and the desire for recognition) cannot adequately explain such central historical phenomena as classes, gender inequalities and the international division of labour. 33 If mis is the case, then the predictive value of his conceptual framework must likewise be open to question.
To summarize, it can be argued that the thesis of the end of history -as the ideological triumph of capitalist economics and liberal democracy -attaches insufficient importance to a number of matters which render ideological divergences inescapable and, indeed, vital. These include the following points: the meaning ascribed to the terms involved is itself at least partly a matter of ideology; the enduring tension between liberalism and democracy invites continuing contestation concerning liberal democracy; liberal democracy is subject to profound -increasingly profoundchallenge; at the end of the twentieth century progress is far from obvious; the scope of support for any version of liberal democracy, even at the level of ideas, is not clear, history follows not a single path but multiple and diverse trajectories that proceed and interact in complex and imponderable ways.
Critics draw diverse conclusions from their analyses of Fukuyama's thesis, though almost all find in it a dangerous inducement to complacency. Huntington's worry is that it may encourage Americans to underestimate the contemporary sources of confirms rather than unsettles established power relations. It represses dissension, struggle, and domination, rather than articulating and addressing them. It presents the world comfortingly, as simple, coherent and ordered, rather than challengingly, as complex, heterogeneous and contingent In seeking to hold onto things as they are, it asserts blithely, but also impotently, that things must be as they are. What this puts in relief is the sense in which liberal millenarianism, for all its professed optimism, is ultimately pessimistic, not -as Fukuyama suggests -because it envisions a world of excessive equality, but because it evokes a world of enduring and immutable inequalities.
II. The 'Norm of Democratic Governance' and Other Theses
Insofar as the thesis of the emerging norm of democratic governance and related claims share the liberal millenarianism of Fukuyama's end of history narrative, the foregoing discussion is rich in implications. Before addressing the issue of these theses' liberal millenarianism, however, it is necessary to set out the arguments involved. For this purpose a distinction may be drawn between those which discuss democracy primarily as a right and those which discuss democracy primarily in more instrumental liberal internationalist terms.
A. Democracy as a Right
The right-oriented theses involve the claim -first advanced by Thomas Franck, 42 but subsequently taken up and developed by others as well 43 -that international law is beginning to embrace a 'norm of democratic governance' or 'global democratic entitlement'. Such a norm or entitlement would mean three things. First, it would entail that the legitimacy of governments is judged by international, rather than purely national, rules and processes. Second, it would connote that those international rules and processes stipulate democracy; that is to say, only democratic governments are legitimate. And third, it would establish that democracy is an internationally guaranteed human right, in respect of which international procedures of monitoring and enforcement are justified and, indeed, required.
How has this norm or right come to 'emerge'? Franck offers the fullest explanation. He traces the normative and customary evolution of the global democratic entitlement by reference to three overlapping phases or 'generations' 44 of international rule-making and implementation. The first generation, born after the First World War (but with older antecedents), is the right of self-detenninatioiL The plebiscites, popular consultations and commissions of inquiry that were mnnript^H at the Versailles Peace Conference in connection with the redrawing of European boundaries gave rise to the idea that 'a people organised in established territory [has the right] to determine its collective political destiny in a democratic fashion'. 43 At the same time, a body of practice concerning plebiscite-holding and international supervision was initiated. This was further developed when self-determination was applied outside Europe in the context of decolonization.
The second generation, born after the Second World War, is the international legal recognition of human rights. With this the idea was established that all human beings have the right to freedoms of expression, thought, assembly and association (among other rights). Procedures for holding governments to their obligations in this regard, and for clarifying the scope of the rights and correlative obligations, were also elaborated. The third generation, still in its infancy, is the right to free and open elections. This was effectively bom with the transformations of the late 1980s. While the right to vote and stand for election had been recognized in key human rights instruments decades before, it was not until those transformations occurred that this right began to be taken seriously as a norm of universal application. It was not until those transformations occurred, in other words, that it became possible to consider this right an emerging norm of customary international law. That it has begun to be taken seriously is reflected in the fact that a substantial majority of states now actually practise 'a reasonably credible version of electoral democracy'.
46 This is also reflected in international efforts to establish and define the 'principle of genuine and periodic elections'; in the increasingly common provision of 'technical assistance' by the UN and other organizations and agencies to governments holding democratic elections for the first time; and in the expanding practice of international and regional election monitoring. Varying his metaphor so as to emphasize the way that the right to free and open elections extends, and depends on, international legal developments with respect to self-determination and human rights, Pranck sometimes refers to these as three 'building stones' 47 in the edifice that is the global democratic entitlement Other scholars likewise hold that, while the global democratic entitlement has had a basis for decades in international human rights instruments, and before that in the principle of self-determination of peoples, it has only recently begun to be respected, monitored and enforced to a significant extent 48 Thus, it has only recently begun to acquire the status of a norm of customary international law. In addition to the evidence of this to which Pranck calls attention, Christina Cerna notes the procedures elaborated in the 1990s within the framework of the Council of Europe and the Or- As this suggests, these scholars take free and fair elections to be the decisive criterion of democracy, though they in no way underestimate the extent to which the right to such elections presupposes other rights, especially freedoms of expression, thought, assembly and association. Elections are in this perspective decisive because they legitimate governance. Thus, the expressions 'democratic entitlement', 'right to democracy', 'norm of democratic governance', 'entitlement to a participatory electoral process', 'right to political participation', 'electoral rights', and the 'right to free and open elections' are employed with relative interchangeability. Franck explains:
The term 'democracy', as used in international rights parlance, is intended to connote the kind of governance that is legitimated by the consent of the governed. Essential to the legitimacy of governance is evidence of consent to the process by which a populace is consulted by its government 5 ® Franck acknowledges that this is a limited conception of democracy. This definition', he observes, 'is not ambitious, it is not necessarily unambiguous, and it is almost certainly not the one Americans would prefer'. 51 But given the diversity of polities and traditions in the world, and given the inbuilt resistance of the states system to the international regulation of national affairs, he considers that this conception or something like it 'probably represents the limit of what the still frail global system of states can be expected to accept and promote as a right of peoples assemble against their own, and other, governments'.
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Gregory Fox and Georg Nolte, while sharing the view that elections are the central issue in a norm of democratic governance, have highlighted that holding regular elections which are free and fair may not always be sufficient to protect the democratic entitlement 53 Where candidates are opposed to liberal democracy, and are committed to the establishment in its place of, for instance, a theocratic political order, the question arises whether those candidates should be allowed to stand. Based on a survey of constitutional laws and traditions of diverse democratic states, Fox and Nolte contend that in customary international law the exclusion of such candidates is warranted, and perhaps even required. This reflects, they observe, a conception of democracy as not simply a set of procedures for ascertaining majority preferences, but rather as a means by which citizens are enabled to enjoy basic rights. Thus, Fox and Nolte find support in customary international law for an account of democracy that tolerates only the tolerant, and that in this respect insists on the value of 'political liberalism'. 54 More generally, they find support for an account of democracy that rests on the liberal notion that government is legitimated not just procedurally but also to the extent that it fulfils its side of the social contract and protects citizens' rights.
Those who advance the thesis of the emerging norm of democratic governance give close attention to the question of how compliance might be monitored and enforced. As noted, existing election-monitoring efforts and innovations with respect to participation in regional organizations are among the developments which persuaded the scholars that the norm was emerging in the first place. They consider a number of possible ways of strengthening enforcement Franck proposes that the 'older democracies' might volunteer to have their elections monitored, so as to encourage a custom of election-observation that might eventually evolve into an obligation. 55 In the longer term, he proposes that democratic government might be set as a precondition to participation in all international organizations, including the United Nations, a proposal also developed by Fox. 56 Franck suggests additionally that democratic government might be made a precondition for fiscal, trade and development benefits, and for the protection of UN and regional collective security measures. He strongly rejects as a means of enforcement unilateral intervention to install or reinstate elected governments, though he finds acceptable collective action at UN or regional level, even, in extreme cases, involving the use of force. Franck considers that, while the question of the scope and incidents of the norm of democratic governance is likely to remain on the international law agenda, the more pressing problem is the monitoring and enforcement of compliance. He urges that the future emphasis of international efforts should be laid accordingly.
37

B. International Law and the 'Liberal Peace'
The writers so far considered base their case for the emerging democratic entitlement on, above all, developments with respect to the holding of elections, international and regional election monitoring, and democratic conditionality in regional organizations. Those whose work will now be reviewed are also impressed with these developments. What strikes them as even more significant, however, is the correlation between liberal democracy and peace. 38 This forms the basis of an argument that there should be a norm of democratic governance, and that the signs that it is emerging confirm this. The theorists of the right to democratic governance also draw support from the correlation between liberal democracy and peace to help explain and vindicate the right 39 Thus, the difference between the two sets of theses is largely one of emphasis. Both sets are at once empirically-based claims that a norm is emerging, speculations concerning its future as Ux Una, explanations of why it is emerging, and justifications for its recognition in international law. And in both sets the so-called 'liberal' or 'democratic' 'peace' plays a part Among the leading proponents of theses of this second type are Fernando Tes6n°°a nd Anne-Marie Slaughter. 61 In presenting the correlation between liberal democracy and peace, they take account of both speculative and empirical literature. With respect to the former, the key figure is Kant These scholars, like the international relations analysts on whose work they draw, look to Kant for the insight that liberal states are likely to maintain peaceful relations with one another. As is well known, Kant held that 'perpetual peace' would depend on three things: every state having a 'republican' constitution; a 'pacific federation' being established among states, in the shape of an agreement to refrain from war against one another, and extensive international commerce, underpinned by 'cosmopolitan law'. Republican government would discourage warfare, he believed, because, if government was accountable to citizens, the fact that citizens would suffer the consequences of war -as soldiers, bereaved civilians, taxpayers, etc. -would serve to engender caution in waging it 62 Internationalists have long attended to the points about the pacific federation and extensive international commerce. Particularly compelling in the aftermath of the twentieth century's two World Wars, these ideas are reflected in the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the United Nations, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Indeed, they inform the whole enterprise of modem international law and institution-building. But what, according to Tesdn, Slaughter and the international relations analysts, has not received sufficient attention is Kant's insight about republican government For these scholars the sort of 'republican' state Kant had in mind corresponds in contemporary terms to a liberal democratic state. 63 The The first implication is that international law should place the question of the legitimacy of governments on its agenda. It should abandon the idea that this is an exclusively national issue. The second implication is that international law should accept as legitimate only liberal democratic governments.. It should stipulate that a legitimate government -one that has a right to exercise sovereign authority -is not just any government that wields factual power, it is a liberal democratic one. Teson calls this a 'Kantian theory of international law'. Slaughter employs the name given by international relations scholars, 'liberal internationalism'. 67 Internationalism evokes the second and third dimensions of Kant's formula for perpetual peace noted above, those that find reflection in international cooperation; liberal internationalism includes also the first dimension, 'republican government'. Against an international law that is in thrall to realism and power politics, Slaughter counterposes a vision of an international law that takes seriously the connection between national political members of society (as men); secondly, the principle of dependence of everyone upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and thirdly, the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens) ' tion corresponds closely to that used by Doyle and other international relations analysts in their work on the 'liberal peace'. 74 Tes6n adopts a similar approach, variously referring to the legitimate state of his 'Kantian theory of international law' as a 'democratic state', 'free state', 'liberal democracy' and 'form of political organisation that provides full respect for human rights'. 73 For both scholars the key feature of a liberal state, which explains its irenic character (at least vis-d-vis other liberal states), is the fact that there are powerful checks on the exercise of public powerconstraints that operate principally through the periodic recall of legislators, the separation of powers and the protection of civil and political rights.
DL Liberal Millenarianism and International Law
It is now possible to return to the question of the relationship between these international legal theses and liberal millenarianism. In this context, the implications for the understanding of democracy that underpins these claims can be brought into view. It will be valuable at the end of this discussion to take stock of the fact that, if these international legal scholars are right, democracy has, will have, or at any rate ought to have, far-reaching significance in international law, as determinant of the legitimacy of governments.
A. Liberal MQlenarian Perspectives
Most likely, all the international legal scholars discussed in this article would locate themselves at some considerable distance from Fukuyama on almost every issue. Certainly, none shares the narrow, elitist outlook that pervades his account of the 'end of history'. A number explicitly dissociate themselves from that account. Franck, for instance, states that he does not consider that '[exulting] in smug satisfaction at the "end of history"' is an appropriate response to the post-Cold War juncture, which he sees rather as an occasion for 'seizing the moment to rethink the basic structure and processes of the international system'. 76 Slaughter explains that liberal internationalism promises a result that is 'neither Utopia nor the end of history, but holds out the hope of at least a small measure of progress toward individual rights and the global rule of law'. 77 There are some grounds for believing that liberal millenarianism may, nonetheless, be built into the form and structure of these scholars' arguments. As discussed earlier, liberal millenarianism includes, but extends beyond, Fukuyama. It is characterized by a progressivist notion of history, coupled with a conceptualization of history's telos in terms of liberalism, and a distinctive voice and tone. On what basis, and to what extent, can it be said that the international legal theses considered here exhibit these features? The second aspect of liberal millenarianism is that history's telos is taken to be liberal democracy, along with a market-oriented economy. It hardly needs restating that this is indeed the goal envisaged in the international legal theses examined here. That this should be so is believed, in the liberal millenarian perspective described earlier, to be supported empirically by the elimination of all ideological alternatives. And it is also believed to be supported normatively. That is to say, these ideological alternatives have been eliminated because they were flawed, as democracy and capitalism -at least in principle, if not in current practice -are not Both points are alluded to in a memorable passage by Franclc 91 The same holds, however, whether democracy is understood in these terms, or in terms of a social contract to protect citizens' rights (as by Fox and Nolte), a mechanism to ensure that government acts not just in its own interests but in the interests of society as a whole (as by Slaughter) or a system of government that is not just prudentially but also morally justified (as by Tes6n). The shared assumption is that democracy refers to the 'process by which the people choose those they entrust with the exercise of power', 92 right 'to participate in the selection of one's own national government'. 93 Yet, according to some political theorists, democracy entails not just the right to participate in the selection of national governments, but also the right to participate directly in decision-making affecting one. 94 For other theorists, democracy involves not just the process of selecting governments, but also the process of connecting people with their governments through civil society. 95 Still other theorists emphasize that democracy requires not just the right to vote and stand for election and associated civil liberties, but also the whole range of further rights that actually enable participation in public life on a footing of equality. 
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But she too neglects to consider how well these constraints on power work, whether they work better for some social groups than others, and whether further constraints might be valuable. With liberal democracy the pinnacle of political developmentand with dictatorship, communism and 'forced march modernization' the only alter- natives ever mentioned 101 -questions concerning liberal democracy's limitations can scarcely arise, let alone be addressed. It is not only issues of the kind just noted that are left out of account, however. The whole matter of liberal democracy's tenability in a world of intensified globalization is largely passed over. While globalizing processes are certainly registered, 102 the ways in which they are putting democracy under strain receive limited attention.
103 These scholars evoke a liberal democracy that is triumphant, vigorous, redemptive.
They also evoke a liberal democracy that provides the key to expanded prospects for peace. In this respect too, however, limitations are glossed over. The 'peace', which some international relations analysts claim is now a 'fact', is a 'liberal peace'; it is said to hold among liberal states. Relations between liberal and non-liberal states are not claimed to be especially pacific, and may, according to the analysts, even be especially aggressive. 104 In finding warrant in this for a norm of democratic governance, the international legal scholars give little attention to the implications of the fact that democratic governance does not appear to induce pacific relations with non-liberal states.
But there is also a much larger limitation of which these writers take insufficient cognizance. The 'peace' that is postulated among liberal states is an absence of armed conflict between them. Yet the Clausewitzean paradigm of war between nation-states to which this refers today fits only a minority of violent conflicts, even large-scale ones. Mary Kaldor highlights that much contemporary conflict arises out of the break-up of states, and centres on issues of 'identity politics' (ranging from religious communalism, to ethnic nationalism, to 'tribalism'). 103 Finally, the international legal arguments are inclined to overstate the significance of the present moment, as an indication of the future. While the possibility of setbacks is certainly acknowledged, the evolutionary logic of the arguments tends to signal that contemporary trends will continue in a more or less linear fashion. As Fukuyama's critics highlight, the processes of historical change appear to be far more complex and contingent than this logic allows.
The observations made by Fukuyama's critics are also worth recalling as regards the consequences of these concerns. There is a danger of inducing complacency, and of prematurely pronouncing liberal democracy's future secure. In masking the limi-tations of liberal democracy, the prospects that those limitations might be addressed are correspondingly reduced. Inequalities may be made to seem, and to become, unalterable. And, to the extent that Kaldor's 'grim prognosis' is inadequately heeded, there is a danger of attaching insufficient importance and urgency to the medicine she prescribes. This entails re-establishing legitimate control of violence at a transnational level.
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To these points might be added further misgivings expressed by international legal commentators. Thomas Carothers argues that '[ajdvocacy of a democratic norm actually highlights [the] West versus non-West division and the tension in international law concerning the fact that it is at root a Western system that Western countries are seeking to apply to the whole world'. 11 • He worries, furthermore, about the harm that might be done, via sanctions or armed intervention, in the 'implementation' of such a norm. Is the way opened up for the waging of 'just wars' or neo-colonial adventures? All the international legal scholars whose work is discussed here recognize the force of this concern.
112 With the exception of Tes6n, none accepts unilateral intervention as a legitimate means of enforcing the norm, though each does appear to accept collective action by regional organizations and the United Nations.
Carothers here echoes a widely shared apprehension as regards the division of the world into liberal democratic and non-liberal democratic states. This is an apprehension that cannot forget all the other notorious divisions of history: between civilized and barbarian, Christian and heathen, European and oriental, developed and underdeveloped. Given the historical record, there is a case to be answered that a norm of democratic governance, like Fukuyama's 'league of democratic nations', would express a 'new ideology of imperialism'.
113 This article's premise is that democracy's universal relevance can indeed be defended. 114 The question is whether it is likely to be defensible within the framework of liberal millenarianism.
That it is not is highlighted in some observations by Martti Koskenniemi. 115 Like Carothers, Koskenniemi warns that a universal norm of democracy will 'always be suspect as a neocolonialist strategy*. The nation-State and its democratic forms may not be for export as pure form', he suggests. They may equally well constitute a specific product of Western history, culture and, especially, economy.'
116 What Koskenniemi appears to have in mind here is the sort of liberal world envisioned in liberal millenarianism. He seems to confirm this when he voices the further concern that a universal norm of democracy is 'too easily used against revolutionary politics that aim at the roots of the existing distributional system and it domesticates cultural and political specificity in an overall (Western) culture of moral agnosticism and rule by the market'.
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If Koskenniemi's objections are informed by the same vision of democracy as that of the commentators he criticizes, then perhaps the source of his disquiet is not democracy per se but that particular (liberal millenarian) vision of it 118 At any rate, his objections are unlikely to be refuted by arguments appealing to such a vision. However, from this it does not follow that those objections are unlikely to be refuted by any arguments. The simple point which this article has sought to recall is that the vision of democracy on which Koskenniemi (in common with Franck, Slaughter and others) relies is not the only one conceivable. Defenders of democracy's universal relevance have a wide range of alternative democratic possibilities upon which to draw. Among these are many that are substantially more congenial to redistribution and difference, and substantially less subordinate to the market and its mangers, than is liberal millenarianism.
B. Conclusion
The thesis of the emerging norm of democratic governance, and the liberal internationalist and neo-Kantian perspectives considered here, grapple with the significance for international law of profound transformations. They call attention to important normative and institutional developments, and connect subject matters more commonly treated in isolation from one another international law and international relations; self-determination, human rights, and electoral assistance; political theory and international law. In doing so, however, they adopt a narrow understanding of democracy, largely equating it with certain liberal institutions. Franck expresses regret that this is all customary international law will currently support 119 Fox recognizes that democracy entails much more than periodic national elections, but considers that elections, being easier for international organizations to monitor than other facets of democratic life, are international law's most appropriate starting point 'It is much more difficult', he observes, 'to stay in a country after elections, for the long haul, to monitor all institutions of government and attempt to secure key elements of democracy ... Elections ... must not end the push to a democratic society, but they are an essential first step'.
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Yet it is not self-evident either that elections are democracy's first step or that ease of monitoring by international organisations should determine international law's priorities. Democracy involves no necessary order of events, and difficulties of monitoring have all too frequently served in international law to make chosen priorities seem unavoidable. 121 This is not to suggest that periodic elections and related institutions lack value. 122 It is just to highlight the way democracy's further dimensions may be eclipsed. This article has sought to show that, whatever may be the constraints of the international legal system, they are not the only constraints in operation here. The scholars' liberal millenarian standpoint also plays a part in shaping the account of democracy that informs their claims.
At the same time, the theses provide powerful reasons for being concerned about this. If a norm of democratic governance indeed 'emerges', this will entail -to reiterate earlier discussion -that international law lays down criteria of governmental legitimacy, and that those criteria require democracy. It may also entail that individuals can claim a human right to democracy. The international legal scholars suggest that the norm should be enforced by making admission to, and participation in, international organizations conditional on democratic government (as is currently the case with some regional organizations). Franck proposes that financial and trade benefits and development assistance, and even the protection of UN and regional collective security measures in the event of an invasion, might likewise be made conditional on democratic government Teson advocates modifications of treaty and diplomatic law that would place further pressure on governments which do not meet the criteria of liberal democracy. Though Tes<5n alone would be prepared to sanction unilateral intervention, the other scholars appear to support collective enforcement Dire consequences could thus follow where legitimacy is denied. From the perspective of citizens, dire -perhaps even direr -consequences could also follow where legitimacy is accorded. This latter danger is easy to overtook. Yet if, in line with the international legal scholarship discussed in this article, liberal millenarianism shapes the criteria used, international law may find itself according legitimacy for what may in some circumstances be the most cosmetic democracy. In so doing, the law may undercut efforts to deepen democracy's purchase in the countries concerned. To the objection that any step in the direction of democracy is better than unmitigated repression, it may be replied that this is not necessarily so if the conditions upon which power is exercised remain essentially unchanged. Where international law confers on a repressive regime a legitimacy that it formerly lacked, the regime is strengthened and counter-authoritarian forces correspondingly debilitated.
According to former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, democracy is today an 'ideal that belongs to all humanity'. 123 To characterize de-mocracy as an ideal is to highlight that it is an engine of criticism and change, necessarily at odds with prevailing realities. To label it as the property of all humanity is to recall, amongst other things, that its institutional complements necessarily reflect the huge diversity of social circumstances to which it is applied. Should international law seek to vindicate efforts animated by such an ideal, then a framework of ideas that posits liberal institutions as history's end scarcely seems an adequate basis on which to proceed
